Insurgency and counterinsurgency : A complex and ambiguous future ahead
- Part 2 -

Yokhanan John Phaltual *

The NSCN (IM) and other nineteen hill-based armed groups, 11 groups under KNO and 8 groups under United Peoples' Front (UPF) mutually agreed to the tripartite (Centre, State and the armed group) ceasefire agreement under the framework of 'Suspension of Operation - SoO'. The SoO main purpose is to find amicable political solution to the long outstanding political agendas through engaging political dialogues. The ceasefire truce freeze operation not only with the Government forces but also amongst themselves, thus weaving space for the armed groups to condense their differences for a collective political goal.

However, each armed groups having different fundamental political charters for the settlement would be like wading across muddy water in the already fractured state of Manipur. If each group with the Indian Government did not have the power to sacrifice part of their claims and lack to foster the spirit of accommodations of give-and-take, the SoO though a milestone, will fail to sustain long. A clear sign is the pulled out of the NSCN (K) of its ceasefire agreement with the Indian Government in March 2015, due to the growing frustration over the fruitless dialogues with New Delhi and the feeling of being sideline on the talks by favoring with the rival outfit NSCN (IM).

The country failed to fully integrate the Northeastern states and its peoples with the national mainstream. Racist attacks, sexual harassment, rapes and discriminations recurring from time to time in New Delhi, Bangalore, Mumbai and other cities is a grueling experience. Indians should pride themselves of such great diversity of India rather than trying to alienate or degrading others from different corners of the country. A better mainstream not only of political and economic integration is enough, but also social integration with the mainstream India is more than necessary.

The feeling of alienation of the north-easterners is one of the factor why the liberation or separatist movements in NEI continues to remain alive. While there is increasing disillusionment among some ethnic groups and sections of society in the revolutionary politics and independent homelands promised by militant groups, a great deal of public sympathy and support to these movements has allowed these groups to continue to survive for over 50 years now.

In Manipur and Nagaland, there is a grotesque and brutal history of security forces. They have faced allegations of human rights violations and the extra-judicial murders committed under the cover of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA of 1958).

The Act is at the heart of feared security apparatus that underpins de facto military rule. The Act provides a veil of immunity for the violent repression of insurgent groups and the communities that supported them.

The epic hunger strike of civil-cum-political rights activist, Irom Chanu Sharmila (also known as "Iron Lady of Manipur") from 2000 to this days against AFSPA, the shocking Kanla Fort protest against AFSPA by a group of daring naked women in 2004, and the the infamous extra-judicial killing of Chongkham Sanjit in 'fake encounter' by the notorious Manipur Police Commandos (MPC) in the heart of the city of Imphal in broad daylight in July 2009, have brought down the to a significant level the military's and police's high-handedness and arrogant abuse of power. Though the misuse of the disdain and dreaded Act is said to have declined in the past five years, yet, these has caused deep resentment among the region's populations as it corroded relations with the local people

The one foremost reason why there can be no concrete and true political settlement is the absent of a solid single insurgent organization or a strongly united umbrella group that represent the particular community or ethnic group. The Underground groups are notorious for their hydra like ability to sub-divide into factions at alarming regularity.

The Indian Central government identified 59 armed insurgent groups in Manipur. Around half are tiny splinter groups; the others range from small ethnic militias to well-equipped rebel armies holding some swathes of territory. The groups' different aspirations, clan rivalries, scope of demands, ideological difference, struggle for dominance, leadership crisis, financial control, inter-factional rivalries, corruption and dissimilar tactics are the reasons for disunity and the cause of splitting the insurgent organizations.

Pressure is needed to force the Indian government to acknowledge that the problems in Manipur and Nagaland are far more complex than 'separatism' or 'terrorism' or 'self-determination', and that these problems cannot be solved through counter-insurgency alone.

The government must blend a policy of comprehensive civilian, political and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with military forces playing an enabling role. Counter-insurgency is an extremely complex undertaking, which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of their own specialist field. Its approaches must be adaptable and agile.

Strategies will usually be focused primarily on the population rather than the enemy and will seek to reinforce the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgency influence. The governments that intent of a counter-insurgency campaign is to build popular support for a government while marginalizing the insurgents; it is therefore fundamentally an armed political competition with the insurgents.

Where the political strategy is vague, unrealistic, or lacking in support from domestic stakeholders, the campaign is unlikely to succeed. An effective political strategy focuses on strengthening the government's capability and and capacity to respond to the needs of its people, by degree of political behavior modification like substantive political reform, greater autonomy, anti-corruption and governance improvement in order to successfully address the grievances that gave rise to insurgency in the first place.

There is no immediate solution to all insurgency problems. Only by building a prosperous economy, cementing international cooperation by deepening ties with Myanmar and China , greater awareness about the Look East Policy and its benefit should be generated among the policymakers and the people, protecting civil rights, greater integration with mainstream politics and respect for unity in diversity, acquiescing to legitimate demand of autonomy, and peaceful diplomacy through political spirit of sacrifice by giving up some core demands not only by the insurgent groups, but also from the Indian Government with no double-standard approach, will usher in the chance for solutions.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency is a complex issue. Albeit there is feasible and attainable solutions, there is no quick-fix panacea. Nevertheless, only one thing is certain at the moment and that is - we are all in the same boat, sharing the same fate and all having an ambiguous future ahead.

Concluded..