Indo–Manipur political dialogue : How feasible is it ?
- Part 2 -

Sanatomba Kangujam *

Mere revocation or repeal of AFSPA will not bring about any tangible solution although such a change may lead to amelioration of collateral damage and minimize the destructive side effects of the conflict to a certain extent. As long as conflict persists, many draconian Acts and new forms of legislation will come into force even if AFSPA gets repealed. Continued imposition of AFSPA or consequent violations ofhuman rights is not the core problem.

The core problem is the armed conflict between the state and the non-state forces. Violation of human rights is merely the by-product of the conflict. There will be rights violation as long as the conflict continues to remain between the state and the non-state forces. So, it will be politically more prudent to address the conflict which constitutes the core of all the problems.

One of the major shortcomings of the human rights movement in Manipur is the failure to underscore the political implications of rights violations while striving to engage the state from a purely legal framework. The human rights crusaders need to free themselves from this legal trapping. Undue stress on human rights violation has overshadowed the conflict which in reality is the cause of the former. Political discourse in Kashmir is articulated more as a demand for rightto self-determination while that in Manipur is more inclined towards the demand for repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. Human rights movement in Manipur has hijacked the movement for national self-determination.

Some quarters also seemed to believe that the prevailing conflict can be resolved by introducing certain measures of administrative reforms. This understanding, however, is highly problematic as the conflict in Manipur is not about problem of administration. Establishment of new administrative structures or restructuring of the existing institutions will have little bearing on the issue at hand.

The conflict in Manipur is not about the crisis inherent in the centre-state relation which is typical of every federal set-up. To capture the conflict in Manipur from the prism of centre-state relations would amount to wrong diagnosis of the problem which in turn would result in wrong prescription of remedies.In this regard, it is pertinent to recall the statement of the UNLF, ''Not even the biggest development package under a new governing structure within the Indian Union can buy us out,"

Equally erroneous is the understanding that a highly protracted conflict which has remained intractable for more than four decades could be resolved overnight by simply signing a peace accord. Normally, peace accords are seldom respected by the conflicting parties and the interpretation of which are often marred in controversies. Nothing would demonstrate better the failure of peace accord in history than those witnessed in the North East with the exception of the Mizo Accord. But the Mizo Accord too has its own side of the story.

The proliferation of Chin-Kuki-Zomi militant groups with the birth of the concept of Zalengam or Zogam is a direct fall-out of the Mizo Accord. Even in Mizoram, the Mizo Accord has not been able to accommodate the political aspirations of smaller ethnic groups who are now demanding autonomous political status for their ethnically defined territories.

Exploring Alternative Models

The Indo-Manipur conflict needs to be resolved at the earliest to prevent further loss of human lives and also to ameliorate the suffering of the common people. It is high time for the parties involved in the conflict to prepare for a long term political engagement. To be contd

This can be rendered possible by first accepting a fact that the issue is a pronounced conflict having an evasive political presence in all aspects of its occurrence as experienced by both the Government of India and the armed opposition groups of Manipur.

Any kind of resolution to the existing politico-military conflict between Manipur and India should be premised on the mutual understanding of each other's political status. To be precise, Manipur should recognize India as a sovereign independent country; likewise India should also recognize the distinct political status of Manipur. Few options may be suggested for bringing about a permanent solution to the Indo-Manipur conflict.

1. Conferment of a "Special Political Status" to Manipur within the Indian Union (not within the Indian Constitution) through a harmonious federal re-arrangement.

2. Formation of the "Union of India and Manipur" with both the political entities as equal constituent units.

These two points may be given a public concern from different sections. However, this concern should involve a critique of the notion of special constitutional status being conferred to Jammu and Kashmir. Because such an understanding will amount to misunderstanding of what constitutes the core issue of the political conflict. It is in this context that the nature of the prevailing conflict and the basic incompatibility underlying it may rather invite us to think in terms of a shift from working out a model on the basis of center-state relations to a deeper project of reformulating the relations between India and Manipur at the governmental level by treating them as two distinct political entities.

We can cite two points to refer to this context. First, a negotiation on how to reach an agreement on conferring a "Special Political Status" to Manipur with its defined 'autonomies' and 'particular relations' it should have with the Government of India can be one way of engaging with the issue. In this case, Manipur will be anindependent state (but not sovereign) within the Indian Union. Here the Government of Manipur and Government of India may be fitted into a model of how two completely different systems are managed to co-exist in one state that we find in the relation between the People's Republic of China and Hongkong.

Second, we may also suggest the formation of the 'Union of India and Manipur', a kind of confederacy with both the political entities as equal constituent units. Under this arrangement, major subjects like Defense, Foreign affairs and Communication may be the defining criteria of the political status that is accorded to Manipur accordingly with the terms of the contract. Other things like 'currency' may be assigned to the Government of India.

The terms of the contract should cover a concrete honor to the independent existence of a political entity called Manipur by allowing it to adopt its own constitution and national symbols of its choices like a national flag including state emblem, national anthem and above all a separate representation in the United Nations.

The two options call for a comprehensive restructuring of the Indian constitution. The present constitution has miserably failed to cater to the needs of changing time. It has failed to accommodate divergent political aspirations of different nationalities residing within the Indian Union. The attempt to build India as a nation-state lies at the root of this failure. Unless India is reconstituted as a multi-national state, the political contradictions that prevail in Indiawill remain intractable for all the time to come. By extension, conflict in the North East in general and Manipur in particular can never be resolved within the framework of the existing Constitution of India.

For the success of conflict transformation in Manipur, all the quarters of concern ought to give a serious thought on the kind of relations that Manipur should maintain with India. Any political solution must impinge upon the political status of Manipur.Because, the basic incompatibility underlying the conflict (in Manipur) pertains to the political status of Manipur irrespective of whether one defines it in terms of sovereignty or autonomy. A political solution implies redefining the relations between India and Manipur. This calls for complete structural transformation of the Indian Constitution and the Indian Union.

Concluded....