The Indo-Naga accord and its electoral portents in Manipur

Thangkhanlal Ngaihte *

Commemoration at TNL Ground, Ukhrul for Peace Accord signed between NSCN (IM) and GoI on Aug 10 2015 :: Pix - Sunzu Bachaspatimayum

This is an exciting, if anxious, time for anyone interested in the history and politics of India's northeast region. The government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM) have, on August 3, 2015 declared that they have concluded their negotiations on the Naga issue and came to an 'historic' agreement. We were treated to a televised accord signing ceremony.

What have they agreed on? More than a week has passed, but we are no wiser. What we know now, through selected leaks, is that the most contentious and crucial demands of the NSCN, viz. political integration of Naga-dominated areas in the northeast, have not been part of the accord.

The sovereignty issue has been discarded a long time ago. As for what's in the accord, we may have to wait till the agreement is placed before the Parliament, as the government has promised to do. But the fact that the NSCN(IM) agreed to end its armed insurgency and came to a compromise agreement with the government is itself very significant.

The accord, whatever its substance, has further burnished the perception that BJP-led NDA government is a government that gets things done: while the BJP is a party of action, the Indian National Congress (INC) is a party of the status quo, at least in matters concerning the northeast.

The perception is not without basis. On matters concerning the northeast – which is always seen through the prism of 'national security' – the INC has always seem undecided, and always second-guessing every option. Take the case of AFSPA. The BJP's position on this issue is well known, and nobody expected it to do anything about the Act. However, the ambivalence of the INC – led UPA government on the issue is telling. It was convinced that the Act needs to be either repealed or amended.

Toward this end, the Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee was set up. The Committee accordingly recommended for the Act's repeal. The government, then, dared not act on its conviction. P. Chidambaram, who was home minister in the UPA government, has since confirmed that while he was in favour of repeal and pushed for it, the government ultimately dare not overrule the objections of the army and hence, the Act remains in force.

On the Naga issue, it was, indeed, the INC-led government under PV Narasimha Rao that first decided to search for a political solution through talks. There soon emerged a consensus amongst all the major parties on this. But, it was the BJP-led Vajpayee government that first recognized, in a written declaration, the 'uniqueness' of Naga history and situation.

It was this government that took the decision, which proved untenable, to extend the ceasefire 'without territorial limits'. Thoughout UPA – I and UPA – II, the NSCN(IM) leaders fret and fume about the lack of leadership in the government, and how they wished a 'statesman' like Vajpayee come back to power. Now the Modi government, in a little more than a year, got us this accord. The BJP certainly has some bragging rights.

The dramatic manner in which the accord came about is also telling. News reports say that only four people - the prime minister, the National Security Advisor, the Government's interlocutor and the home minister - have advance knowledge of the accord. The home ministry bureaucrats and the army were apparently in the dark.

The prime minister himself said that his office directly oversaw the final stretch of the talks process. For some people, this is yet another sign of the dictatorial nature of Modi. May be it is. But, it is also marks a reassertion of the civilian executive vis-a-vis the national security establishment in matters of the northeast. In any case, the issues and the compromises necessary have long been well known, so it is disingenuous to say that more consultations are necessary.

Here in Delhi, the union Home ministry has accepted the recommendations of the MP Bezbaruah Committee report in toto. The recommendations, if sincerely implemented, will go a long way in improving the life of northeasterners in Delhi and other metro cities. On balance, the response of the government and police to cases of racial discrimination and abuse have improved a lot.

Electoral picture

Will this help the party in terms of electoral politics? It is important to note that the BJP has still been seen as a Hindu party in the hill states of the northeast, some of which are predominantly Christian. In the 2014 general elections, while the Modi-led BJP wave swept through mainland India, the northeast remained an outlier to this national trend. Out of the eight northeastern states, including Sikkim, the BJP managed to make its presence felt only in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

In Assam which have 14 Lok Sabha seats, the BJP won seven seats while the INC got only three. In 2009, it was the INC that won seven and the BJP four. In Arunachal Pradesh, the BJP wrested one seat (out of two) from the INC which won both seats in 2009. In Nagaland, the Naga Peoples Front (NPF), which has an alliance with the BJP, retained the only seat. The party failed to make its mark in the other five states.

There are many reasons for this. The BJP's Hindu character is certainly one. To the tribal Christians of northeast India, the BJP's pet themes like ban on cow slaughter, the emphasis on Hindi language, uniform civil code, etc. are anathema. The recent attacks on minority religious institutions and the general ascendancy of Hindu right groups make them worry about their religious freedom. Also, the BJP simply did not have committed cadre and grassroot organization in the region to match that of the INC. The region has never been the BJP's priority.

In places like Manipur valley, the Indo-Naga talks casts a dark shadow. It is significant, as I have argued elsewhere ('Reading Manipur's Electoral Trends', Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 8 (III & IV), pp. 121-30), that in the summer of 2001 when Manipur valley was in turmoil over the central government's ill-fated decision to extend its ceasefire agreement with the NSCN(IM) without territorial limits, the BJP had 26 MLAs in a 60-seat assembly. In the assembly election held the next year, 2002, the BJP's tally came down to four seats and in the last two assembly elections, in 2007 and 2012, the party drew a blank even as the INC further consolidates its gains, both in the valley and hills.

The latest Naga accord will further cement Manipur valley's hostility to the BJP. But, in the hill areas, things may change. The hill-valley divide is deep. While the valley is consumed by fear of the nameless outsider which presently express itself through agitations for Inner Line Permit system, the hills are in fear of being overwhelmed by the valley Meiteis. As the INC-led government in the state and the party itself come to be seen as representing Meitei interests, the hill tribals are on the lookout for a party sympathetic to their concerns.

Political demands

While politics of the Naga dominated districts is generally aligned with the greater Naga movement, politics in the Zomi-Kuki areas is controlled by two underground groupings, viz. United Peoples Front (UPF) and Kuki National Organization (KNO) both of which are having a Suspension of Operations (SoO) arrangement with the Indian army since around 2005. They are demanding 'Autonomous Hill State (AHS)' and a full-fledged Kuki state respectively and anxiously waiting for a political talk with the Indian government. Following the NSCN, they have increasingly become frustrated with the state government and the INC generally. The anxiety is heightened by the present accord which will likely have something for the Naga areas in Manipur. Then, what will become of the Zomi-Kuki areas? (To be contd)

Under the circumstances, the longstanding demand for 6th schedule provision in the tribal areas of Manipur is expected to escalate in the coming days. Between the Meitei's adamant stand against dilution of Manipur's territorial unity and the hill tribals' insecurity, 6th schedule seem to offer the best compromise for both sides. 6th schedule is not a one-model provision. Between the Bodoland Territorial Council model and Khasi Autonomous District Council model, there is enough space to accommodate the needs of Manipur tribals.

The demand for 6th schedule for Manipur hills have a long history as I have written elsewhere (See, http://ifp.co.in/page/items/23715/manipur-hill-areas-and-the-demand-for-6th-schedule). As recently as September 2014, members of the six ADCs in Manipur hills held demonstrations in Delhi's Jantar Mantar demanding upgradation of the existing ADCs to 6th Schedule. Indeed, it was on this issue that a crack opens up between the state government and the ADCs, both of which are controlled by the INC during the ADC elections in May-June this year.

In 2010, when elections for Autonomous District Council (ADC) in the hills were held after a gap of 21 years, it was dominated entirely by the INC. In the last election held in June, the picture became fragmented. In Churachandpur district which is the biggest district in Manipur dominated by the Zomi-Kuki group, most of the incumbent candidates, who were already awarded INC tickets, spurned the Congress party and contested as independents.

18 independent candidates were elected (in a total of 24 elected seats) and 17 of them later form the Hill Peoples Alliance (HPA). The INC managed to win only five seats while the BJP opened its account by winning one seat. In fact, while the INC was in power in all the six ADCs during the last term, the party managed to retain majority only in the Sadar Hills ADC this time round.

Langkhanpau Guite, leader of the HPA and who was re-elected Chairman of the Churachandpur ADC, told me that while they endorse the demand for Autonomous Hill State (ATS) for Manipur hills, they also recognize that 6th schedule remains the most feasible under the present circumstances. Efforts are on to ramp up the demand in a coordinated manner, he added.