"Breach of Faith with the Princes" :: From 1949 to Sana Konung Take over

Arambam Noni *

Sana Konung (Royal Palace) on 24th June 2013 :: Pix - Bullu Raj

The June 2013 cabinet decision of the Government of Manipur to take over Sana Konung needs attention not only for having hurt the sentiments and symbolism of the Royal Palace but also for unfolding some of the intricate dictates involved in the making of modern statein India. For the scholarships that subscribes to the legacy and communist politics of comrade Hijam Irabot treading on this aspect of discourse or commentingon monarchy may appear ideologically puzzling. Nonetheless, the making of post-colonial 'national' state in India is more or less a story of bringing in multitude of princely states. It consumed as many as 565 odd Princely States to constitute what one calls India today. Comparatively, in some cases it was smooth where as some were nothing less than a bizarre project of the Indian nationalists.

One can relate to this ideological context of national state in India the current issue of Sana Konung 'take over'. The issue can be well put into perspective in order to question the nature of integration politics in the immediate aftermath of India's independence. The hefty task before the mainstream Indian nationalist was to somehow retain the British Indian Empire. The realisation of the same was easier said than done.

The integration complex was rooted in the fact that the British India was divided into two political segments; British Indian Provinces and the Princely States. The Provinces were under the direct control of the British Government whereas the Princely States were allowed to enjoy freedom in their "internal affairs". The status of these princely states came to known as Paramountcy or suzerainty of the British crown.

Numerically speaking, speaking these Princely States constituted one-third of the British Indian Empire's territoriality. As the paramountcy of the Crown lapsed with the departure of the British, the idea of a united India was highly fluid as the Princely States had begun to raise their heads again. Among the Princely States, Hyderabad, Junargarh, Kashmir and Manipur were exceptionally averse to the idea of joining the Indian Union.

It was during this juncture the Standstill Agreements, Instrumentof Accessions and Merger Agreements were signed between theGovernment of India and the Princely States. Manipur was one of the most difficult cases that India's integration politics had encountered. As "The Manipur Merger Agreement" of 21st September 1949was done under duress, the agreement made several promises to the then Maharaja to cover up the authoritarian language. A probe into how the promises proved to be futile and temporal from the perspectives of the integrated States can help one to establish a connection and continuity between the history and politics of 21st September and recentSana Konungeviction move.

The integration of Princely States was characterised by two important objective strategies. First, it was designed to retain the British India imperial cartography. The cartographic ambition was reaffirmed in the year 1950 when Jawaharlal Nehru on the floor of Lok Sabha stated "our maps show that McMohan Line is our boundary and that is our boundary, map or no map. The fact remains and we stand by that boundary, and we will not let anybody come across that boundary". Such a cartographic or mapping approach has converted the northeast intoa theatre of 'great game'of Sino-Indian relations.

Second, theoretically the post-1947 India's approachtowards the Princely States was similarto that of the British as the power of Princely States wasclipped to something called 'internal freedom'. The September 21st Act somewhat replicates the Paramountcy framework of the British as one of the articles of the September Act reads "His Highness the Maharaja Shall Continue to enjoy the same personal rights, priviledges, dignities, title, authority over religious observances, customs, usage, rites and ceremonies and institutions in charge of the same in the State, which he would have enjoyed had this agreement not been made".

The integration of the princely states left India with no option but to make some tall claims. In the case of Kashmir a plebiscite was to be conducted to allow the Kashmiris to decide whether to remaina part of India or vice-versa. In the case of Nagaland, a plebiscite was conducted in 1951 in which 99 percent favoured the idea of independence.

The plebiscite pulse in Kashmir and Nagaland did not find a positive engagement in the post-British India. The present take over move of Sana Konung is among the corollaries of unmet promises made to the former Princely States.The power and status of these states began to diminish and falter in the subsequent years. Two important reasons can explain why the State in India wanted to rethink and retreat from what was promised during the integration days. Once the majority of the former Kingdoms were integrated, their status were reviewed and reduced. Manipur becoming a part C state and a Union territory are among the most cited examples.

Second, the 1970s witnessed debates within the Indian National Congress to completely revoke the status and privileges given to the Princely families. The 26th Constitutional Amendment of 1971 abolished "the concept of rulership, with privy purses" which is a violation of the 21st September Act as it entitled the Maharaja of Manipur to receive an "annual Privy purse of three lakhs" and to treat "the property of the Maharaja as distinct from State properties" (article iii and iv). The move to abolish Privy Purse was strongly opposed from several quarters as a result of which Rajya Sabha could not ratify the proposal in 1970. A political leader went on to term the move as morally wrong and amounted to a "breach of faith with the princes".

The amendmentswith regard to the status and power of the erstwhile Kingdoms can be understood against the backdrop of the overall federal shrinkage of 1970s in India.For example, India agreed to offer a novel federal structure to Sikkim during its merger. Sikkim was to enjoy a special status of an 'associate state' without being a member of the Union of India, according to the 35th amendment Act, 1974. This strange federal experiment was scrapped and undone in the following year with the 36th amendment, 1975. Thus, the experiences of the erstwhile Kingdom States in India after the British have failed to escape from successive faltering anddiminution.

The ongoing protest against Sana Konung take over reflects a politics that resist any further onslaught on thepolitical and cultural significance of theKingship.What is more significant is the way in which the royal institution has been recovered to symbolise the history of State system in Manipur. The politics that believes in the relevance of this symbolism consider the titular existence of the Maharaja as integral to the emergence of Manipur – as a national geo-body.In the last one decade or so, the conflict torn Manipur has seen a pro-active participation of the titular King particularly in the fields of re-rejuvenating cultural moorings and ease ethnic cauldron in the state.

The Titular King has been frequenting the public sphere with commendable ability to communicate with a wider section of people cutting across ethnicities. For instance, the meeting between the present titular King Leishemba Sanajaoba and Th. Muivah, NSCN-IM Ato Kilonser, at Hebron in May this year is considered to be a highly rated political gesture. Interestingly, Mr. Muivah has reportedly described the meeting as "very historic, valuable and of utmost importance".

The thesis of re-inculcating shared moorings that is being flagged off time and again to trace a pan-Manipuripolity has gained momentum in the recent past. Such a conception is what Anthony Smith calls primordial foundations of nationalism. In the words of Smith a nation is "a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture and a common economy".

Apparently, Sana Konung has been able to signify its centrality in this format of nationalism reminds of what Thai historian Thonghcai argues in the case of Thailand. Thongchai argues "development of Thaines which comes through the role of Monarchs (and great leaders) while selectively adopting only good things from the West for the country and preserving the traditional values at their best". The core argument of protestors against the proposed Sana Konung eviction seems to endorse the thesis of Thongchai. Such a propositionis understandably to go unwell with the "Indian ideology" in the long run particularly in Manipur where there is armed political conflict.

Therefore, the politics of eviction and protest against the same has thrown up three differentdirections of mobilisation. One, the "take over" fall into is in the same nationalist lineage of consolidating the 'Indian ideology". Second,the protest hasunfolded an attempt to re-institute Manipuri nationalism through a political and symbolic reading of Sana Konung. And third, the opposition has also signified an alternative reading of museum and monument.

To sum up with a note of caution, the issue of reverting back to Monarchy, on the one hand, and giving a critical response to the Sana Konung, take over or even protesting, on the other, are to be read as two differentstreams of politics.