The emergence of new geopolitics in Myanmar and India's troubled borderlands
- Part 1 -

Maheshsana Rajkumar *

A graphic map showing Indo-Myanmar boundary in the territory of Manipur : Pix - TSE

The recent announcement on 9 November by junta-installed president of Myanmar Former General U Myint Swe sent an unusual alarming message across the nation, the imminent threat of Myanmar breaking apart if the military fails to crush a joint offensive by ethnic armed groups fighting in Shan State bordering China.

This was followed by another development on 20 November; the report indicates Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military showing signs of a notable decline with rebel forces having captured more than 8,000 square kilometers, nearly half of the nation. Earlier in September 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government in exile emerged.

NUG started the defensive war against the state military with the creation of militias targeting the junta and its economic base. The Ethnic Arm Organisations (EAOs) of Myanmar have been fighting the Tatmadaw for decades and some of the armed ethnic groups have in recent times coordinated with the NUG militias to overthrow junta.

The three ethnic armies namely the Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a majority Han Chinese ethnic, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Palaung, or Ta'ang, people and the Arakan Army (AA), the Rakhine people with large migrant population in the east of the country helped to establish the Arakan Army, now one of the best-equipped forces in Myanmar, started operation 1027, and got the name operation 1027 because it was launched on October 27. The formidable Three Brotherhood Alliance was formed by these three EAOs as a result of the coordination activities and in order to fulfill their ambitious territorial expansion in Myanmar.

In the present conflict, China did not give any restraining order to the Myanmar ethnic armed groups operating along the border with China. The estimate loss of US$40 billion on online scam angered the Chinese on the junta's inaction.

The conflicts in Myanmar are leading to an emergence of new geopolitics. Mention may be made of Myanmar, a country in possession of vast natural resources marred with civil unrest and instability since 1 February 2021 coup. Myanmar is an ideal battleground of China and America. The ethnic armies namely the Karen, the Kachin, the Karenni and Chin allied with the National Unity Government (NUG), which was set up by the elected administration that was deposed by the coup.

The various others armed ethnic groups operating in Shan State bordering China and Thailand did not ally with NUG. The various People's Defence Force (PDF) groups across the country have aligned with well-organized armed groups, such as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.

The fall out of junta is well narrated in the article written by Ronan Lee titled, "Myanmar's military junta appears to be in terminal decline", published in 'The Wire' on 19 November 2023. Ronan Lee gives insightful information on China's role and Post-junta planning in Myanmar as follows:

China's role

Brotherhood Alliance members are themselves territorially ambitious, but rely on China for arms so it is unlikely an operation in China's hinterland could have occurred without China's acquiescence. Allowing this operation to go ahead is a strong statement by a Chinese government frustrated with the junta's inaction on online scam centres in Shan State where thousands of trafficked Chinese and other foreigners have been forced to work in slave-like conditions.

China's strategic ambiguity is unsurprising. China was far from enthusiastic about the 2021 coup. China's ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, told journalists at the time a coup was, "absolutely not what China wants to see". While traditionally a key international ally of the junta, China's leadership had a very close relationship with Myanmar's ousted de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and maintains close ties with many of Myanmar's ethnic armed groups.

Now, strategic reversals, nationwide territorial losses and economic decline mean momentum has strongly shifted away from Myanmar's junta. China's leadership may have read the situation better than most, recognising the junta may now be in a death spiral.

Others have been less shrewd. Russia has displaced China as the junta's biggest arms supplier accounting for US$406 million (£326.5 million) of Myanmar's arms imports since the coup and crucially providing aviation fuel in exchange for funds, access to Bay of Bengal port facilities, and regional relevance.

Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing recently welcomed Russia's navy for joint maneuvers, describing Vladimir Putin in glowing terms as a "leader of the world who is creating stability on the international arena". For Putin, this may soon be embarrassingly unwelcome praise. By linking itself so closely with a declining junta, Russia guarantees its Myanmar influence and regional relevance will not outlast military rule.

Post-junta planning

The NUG idealises a post-junta Myanmar unified under its leadership with Aung San Suu Kyi returned to power. But for many ethnic armed groups – who will feel they, rather than the NUG, inflicted the strongest blows on the junta and now control significant territory – that is not likely their preferred outcome. They will seek guarantees about key demands around federalism and minority rights that were not satisfactorily addressed when Aung San was last in power.

The junta appears on a clear path to defeat, but this will not be immediate. Meanwhile, the state's military forces commonly respond to reversals with shocking violence, so bringing junta rule to a speedy end must be prioritised. Myanmar's population and neighbouring states will also not want the country, post-junta, to descend into the same sort of fractured instability as in the immediate post-independence period.

Myanmar's neighbours, ASEAN, and western powers who have talked tough on human rights in Myanmar, including the US, UK and EU, must now take steps to ensure the post-junta future plays out peacefully with all resistance groups included in decisions about Myanmar's future.

The transitional period after the removal of the military will require a commitment from international actors to ensure the stability of the country, perhaps like the Cambodian UNTAC process in the 1990s. Rather than being again caught on the hop by events in Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN should begin preparations to manage the transition to a post-junta Myanmar that now appears increasingly likely.

The Map of US' Indo–Pacific Strategy shows the drawing of Quad consisting of four members namely Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The four Quad members have played a major role in purposefully redefining the "Asia-Pacific" as the "Indo-Pacific", to deepen trans-regional ties between the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, and to, in their words, deal more effectively with the rise of China, the Middle East and Africa

India's troubled borderlands

China had been the dominant power in East Asia for centuries before the arrival of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century. United States sees China's hegemony in Myanmar. The Indian government is sounding the alarm about what the repercussions would be in the increasing turmoil in Myanmar borderlands with India.

This calls for more vigilance in the northeastern states of Manipur and Mizoram. There is a strong possibility that China could play a major role in influencing the EAOs of Myanmar post junta. Earlier India had boundary issues with China in Ladakh and in the states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh..

The United States and European Union's had an ulterior motive to depose junta after 2021 coup. They even imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar government and the high ranking military regime officials. The aim of western allies is to install democratic elected government thereby curbing the growing influence of China's rising graph in the global economy and military scene.

On the other hand, China is well determined to dominate the strategic continent of Asia militarily, culturally, politically and economically. The Myanmar crisis gave the most needed impetus to China as serious challenger to emerging superpower status after United States.

As of today the China's aggression on Myanmar is directed towards the consolidation of the invested projects. China and Myanmar trade relations grew in1988 after western sanctions were imposed on Myanmar. On 5 August 1988, China signed a major trade agreement, legalizing cross-border trading and began supplying considerably military aid.

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is a number of infrastructure projects supporting connectivity between Myanmar and China. It is an economic corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The infrastructure development plan calls for building road and rail transportation from Yunnan Province in China through Muse and Mandalay to the seaport city, Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State. The transportation route follows gas and oil pipelines built in 2013 and 2017. At the end of the route, a port and Special Economic Zone is planned at Khaukphyu.

The largest construction project along the route is the 431-kilometre Muse-Mandalay Railway, a project estimated to cost US$9 billion. The newly built railway would connect to the Chinese railway network at Ruili, Yunnan province.

On the other hand, India had invested in the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project passing through the Chin State of Myanmar.

The Kaladan Road Project is a US$484 million project connecting the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe seaport in Rakhine State, Myanmar by sea. In Myanmar, it will then link Sittwe seaport to Paletwa in Chin State via the Kaladan river boat route, and then from Paletwa by road to Mizoram state in Northeast India.

All components of the project, including Sittwe port and power, river dredging, Paletwa jetty, have been completed, except the under construction Zorinpui-Paletwa road. Originally, the project was scheduled to be completed by 2014, but end-to-end project is expected to be fully operational only by December 2023 as per November 2023 update.

The route of the project around Paletwa is less than 20 km from the Bangladesh border and along the Kaladan River is troubled by the Chin conflict, Rohingya conflict, and militant groups such as Arakan Army and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).

The Kuki-Chin people inhabiting Myanmar along the border with Manipur wanted to merge with India in the past. Maloy Krishna Dhar in his book, "Open Secrets India's Intelligence Unveiled", 2005, writes as follows:

"Kuki and Chin population of Burma living in the administrative units under Singgel, Sekshi, Pantha, Kuzet and Thygon often assisted them in demanding merger of the Burmese Kuki and Chin areas with India. It was a dangerous move.

The Kukis and other allied tribes had originally migrated to Manipur from Burma at a point of time when hegemony of the Manipur kings often stretched up to the Kabow valley and the banks of Chindwin." In the changing political scenario in Myanmar the question now arises will India rethink the earlier merger demands of the Kuki-Chin inhabited areas of Myanmar with the Indian Union in the event of a possible breakup?

The serious posed to China is whether will it allow the Kachin and Chin EAOs the merger of Kuki-Chin inhabited areas of Myanmar into the Indian Union. The merger idea may not go down well with China taking into consideration the influence and dominance they want to exercise on the EAOs, particularly the Kachin and Chin EAOs. This merger if it becomes a reality in India will have dangerous implications for the Meiteis of Manipur.

To be continued....