Nation and State-building, Self-determination and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia
- Part 3 -
Prof. Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar *
14th Martyrdom Anniversary of Arambam Samarendra at Khurai on 10 June 2014 :: Pix - Daniel Chabungbam
The full text of the 9th Arambam Somorendra Memorial Lecture which was held on June 10, 2014 at Manipur Dramatic Union, Imphal and delivered by Prof. Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar of the Universiti Sains Malaysia
Challenges in Resolving Self-Determination Type Struggles
The continuous existence of self-determination type struggles in the region shows
how difficult it is to resolve these conflicts. The use of weapons and violent means on
all sides only compounded the problem even more. Over the last 50 years, only
Brunei has peacefully become independent in 1984. Even Singapore's independence
from Malaysia in 1965 was preceded by violent riots in some cities on the peninsula.
Timor Leste's independence was preceded by an armed struggle of the Timorese
people against Indonesian domination and was only made possible by international
pressures on Indonesia in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis in 1997. All in
all, decolonizing and becoming an independent nation is never easy. Even after
independence the problems continue as has been noted in the previous section.
Lingering issues continue during the power struggle between the new ruler and the
newly ruled groups demanding self-determination. Some challenges and lessons
learnt from the cases in the region include the following.
Power Struggle between the Centre and Periphery
Becoming a new State entails recognition of sovereignty by the international
community, including admission into the United Nations. More importantly, and prior
to that, this recognition has to come from within. There has to be recognition of State
sovereignty by the people being ruled. The people in most cases just follow the lead
of elites in giving blessings to the new State. The elites then in turn commandeered
support for the creation of the new State through a liberation movement, a
referendum, a 'social contract', even an armed uprising. The act of State creation then
goes through various phases, including the handing over of sovereignty of the people
to the State and giving the State the mandate to rule over the people.
Unfortunately,
the process also involved manipulation of the majority and even the State to ensure
that territories are included and groups pacified and persuaded to join the new State.
Take for instance 'social contract' between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians prior to
independence of Malaya in 1957; the formation of Malaysia in 1963; the London
Treaty of 1909 between Siam and Britain; struggle for independence of Indonesia in
late 1940s and Panglung Agreement of 1947 in Burma, etc.
The power struggle between the centre and periphery that resulted after independence
show the dissatisfaction between the State and the people, especially those forced or
manipulated to be part of the new State. This in turn would be translated into
movements to support self-determination aspirations of the aggrieved populace in the
affected regions. The questions asked include the legality of inclusion and the
question of sovereignty – sovereignty of whom over whom; sovereignty of State over
the sovereignty of the people or likewise; and the question of indivisibility of the
State.
Multiplicity of Actors
An important part of the problem is the multiplicity of actors involved on all sides. In
many cases, there are simply too many actors involved and this has compounded the
problem of finding a solution that can help pacify the interests of all. In the case of
Myanmar, the needs of more than 100 ethnic groups have to be addressed. Even the
current ceasefire agreement with only 14 groups is very complicated. In the Patani
struggle of Thailand, there are multiple actors on both sides – on one side the
politicians, military, royal family and on the other side the PULO, BRN and BIPP,
etc. Similarly, there are multiple actors in the Bangsamoro struggle – government,
military, MNLF, MILF, Abu Sayyaf, etc.
All actors have stakes, interests and needs in the conflict. The question then involves
not only addressing the issues and answering the questions but also how to balance
these multiplicities of needs and interests. The question also involves the sincerity of
the elites (for whom and for what?) and the issue of representativeness – how much
do they actually represent the grievances and aspirations of the people.
Strategy and the Use of Weapons by the Actors
The next issue involves strategy and the use of weapons by the actors. When the selfdetermination
movements turned into an armed struggle, it elevates the conflict to
another level. On the movement side, this is to address the asymmetrical nature of the
conflict and a necessary precursor to future talks. They need to be taken seriously and
in their minds they will not be taken seriously until they can show that they are
capable of inflicting pain on the other side. On the side of the government, this is an
affront to the State's sole monopoly of the usage of arms and need to be put down.
Oft times, too, the State does not wait for armed uprising to happen and take unilateral
action to violently suppress the movements. This in turn usually will result in likeminded
actions on the other side even if there was no real intention to use this
strategy. Cases in point would be Aceh, Mindanao and Patani. Prolonged use of this
strategy usually results in the creation of a culture of violence which is very difficult
to put down. The issue needs to be addressed though if resolution is to be achieved.
Difficulty of Finding Solutions Bilaterally
A problem with self-determination struggle is the difficulty of finding solutions
bilaterally. The positions of the sides are usually too entrenched for them to move on.
Third party interveners can help. The problem is convincing the parties that they need
this help, especially the government sides of the conflict. De-colonisation issues and
unsolved problems connected to these issues are seen as internal matters that should
be resolved internally.
Furthermore, we are talking about the sovereignty of the nation
and the reputation of the State. The State would feel more comfortable if the process
of finding the solution is one that they are in control of. Third parties are accepted if
and only if they subscribe to the principles of the sovereignty and indivisibility of the
State. Cases in point – Aceh, Bangsamoro and Patani. But when they are invited,
these third parties have shown that they are not only capable of helping to improve the
situation, but in many cases becoming crucial components for alleviating the violence,
implementing agreed actions, guaranteeing and monitoring decisions made and so on.
Models of Ruling
When we try to settle once and for all the problems of decolonisation, especially in
regards to self-determination issues, we have to take into account not only the points
mentioned above but also the models of ruling that is capable of pacifying the needs
and interests of the sovereign people. In general, there are three models of ruling as
given below.
First is the 'simple majoritarian rule of ruling'. It refers to elimination of all kinds of
differences to become one. Centralised and unitary form of governance will be
representative of this one coupled with insistence on nation building based on the
majority dominant tradition in the country such as Thailand. This is not a good model
and has given rise to many self-determination struggles by groups that feel the need to
preserve their identities and collective rights.
Second model is the 'complex representational model' that will guarantee justice and
equality. This includes the model of federalism, even decentralisation which is being
touted as a lesser form of the federal system in the unitary model i.e. Malaysia and to
a certain extent Indonesia in its current form. The same model is also being mentioned
as a possible solution to the Myanmar problem.
Third is the 'Hybrid model'. In this model, certain parts of the country are ruled by
one model while other parts of the country are ruled by different models. It includes
the autonomous or special autonomy model being used in some provinces of countries
like Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. This is also the current preferred
solution to the problems in the Bangsamoro – the State within a State model created
by the Bangsamoro peace process. In many cases, the State did not start out with this
form after independence.
The failure of the chosen model points to the need to adapt existing form of
governance to one that will address the demands of the aggrieved populace. Further,
failure of the models will result in civil war. On the plus side, however, it might even
result in alternative forms of government. Who knows, maybe we will get a new
model that caters to the special needs of the region coming out of the selfdetermination
struggles in this area.
Conclusion
Self-determination as reflected here is not a dirty word as bandied by those in power.
It is not something that was created for frivolous reasons, but something that has
come up because of unfinished business in the decolonisation process of a nation. It
represents collective rights of a distinct group of people and is a driver of genuine
democracy.
It is, thus, a form of conflict resolution because it envisions a solution to
the problem through the restructuring of relationships, modes of governance and
addressing real needs of the people. For it to be successful though, it needs to be
translated into action and into actual new relations, guided by a new arrangement,
constitution or structure. When this happens, you will see peace in the region. These
are the lessons we have learnt from the challenges of decolonisation in Southeast
Asia. They might be of use to friends here in the Northeast part of India.
Profile of Speaker
Prof. Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at
Universiti Sains Malaysia. He is the Coordinator of the Research and Education for
Peace at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM). He is
also the Regional Coordinator of the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network
(SEACSN). He sits on the board of many international networks including the
Southeast Asian Human Rights Network (SEAHRN) and the Global Partnership for
the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). He is active in peacebuilding and
conflict transformation activities around the Southeast Asian region and has worked
in Aceh – Indonesia, Patani – Southern Thailand, Mindanao – Philippines, and
Myanmar. He has published many articles and edited books on peacebuilding in these
areas. He can be reached at zam(at)usm(dot)my
Concluded...
* Prof. Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar presented this paper for the 9th Arambam Somorendra Memorial Lecture on held on June 10, 2014
This paper is forwarded by Homen Thangjam who can be contacted at homenth(at)gmail(dot)com
This article was posted on July 05, 2014.
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